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COMMENTS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-THE CARRIER'S RESERVED
RIGHT OF INSPECTION AND THE INJURED EMPLOYEE
A common practice among workmen's compensation carriers is to re-
serve the right to make safety inspections at the place of business of the
insured employer.' This reservation is a mere gratuitous service provided
by the insurer as a means of evaluating the risks covered by the work-
men's compensation policy in order to regulate the insured's premiums,
but it does not preclude the insured from conducting his own program
of safety control. As such, the carrier has a right, arising out of his insur-
ance contract with the employer, but no duty to inspect.2 Nevertheless,
insurers have incurred liability on gratuitous safety inspections when
performed negligently.3 However, it was not until 1960 that an injured
employee, eligible for statutory compensation award, brought any type
of action against her employer's workmen's compensation carrier as a
third party tortfeasor. 4 The gravamen of this novel case was the insurer's
failure to make gratuitous inspections with due care.5 Since then, other
actions based on the same theory have been brought against workmen's
compensation carriers, and the law in this area is beginning to develop.
It is the purpose of this comment to discuss the development and
analyze the arguments favoring and opposing the liability of a workmen's
compensation carrier to an injured employee. The ramifications of such
liability can only be understood through a discussion of the liability for
a gratuitous undertaking by any insurer, whether or not a workmen's
compensation carrier. Essential to this discussion is the distinction between
nonfeasance and misfeasance of a gratuitous undertaking. After these
general concepts have been considered, the problems involved in allowing
an action against a workmen's compensation carrier as a third party tort-
feasor can be approached.
I See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, app. E, p. 570 (1961); ABA Comm. on
Workmen's Compensation & Employers' Liability Insurance Law, Standard Work-
men's Compensation and Employers' Liability Insurance Policy 37-38 (rev. ed. 1949).
See also Viducich v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596
(Super. Ct. 1963).
2 Brief for Appellee, p. 22, Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199
N.E.2d 769 (1964).
8 Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 Fed. 617
(7th Cir. 1912); Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 AtI.
472 (1890); Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 Wash. 2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940).
4 26 NACCA L. J. 223, 225 (1960).
5 Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960).
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LIABILITY FOR A GRATUITOUS UNDERTAKING
The doctrine that a person who negligently performs a gratuitous un-
dertaking can incur liability was announced as early as 1703 in Coggs v.
Bernard.6 This doctrine has been adhered to by American courts ever
since,7 and, as mentioned, has found application against insurers, other
than workmen's compensation carriers. In Hartford Steam Boiler Inspec-
tion & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Breewing Co.,8 the defendant was held liable when
the plaintiff's boilers, which had been gratuitously and negligently in-
spected by the defendant, exploded. The court stated that, "inspection of
the boilers . . . requires care and skill in its performance [and though
done gratuitously, once] undertaken by the [defendant] the duty arises
[to] exercise reasonable care and skill in each inspection. . ... ,9 Liability
was also incurred in Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,10 where the de-
fendant was found guilty of negligence when an elevator which it had
insured injured a tenant after the defendant had made several voluntary
inspections." On the other hand, insurers which had reserved the right
of inspection avoided liability in Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp.,
12
Zamecki v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,'8 and Viducicb v. Greater N.Y.
Mut. Ins. Co.14
In Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,5 the Illinois Supreme Court
distinguished the three last mentioned cases from those holding the insurer
liable.16 The court noted that in the latter group the insurers had made
positive, regular, and periodic gratuitous inspections, whereas in the for-
mer the insurers had undertaken no such course of conduct, with the
exception of the Zamecki case' which was dismissed as being "a distinct
62 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
7 See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
8 Supra note 3.
9 Id. at 629. Again in Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., supra note 3,
an insurer incurred liability when a boiler which it gratuitously and negligently in-
spected exploded.
'0 Supra note 3.
11 Accord, Bollin v. Elevator Constr. & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949).
12 206 Cal. App. 2d 96, 23 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
13 202 Md. 54, 95 A.2d 302 (1953). See also Donohue v. Maryland Cas. Co., 248
F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1965), wherein the court stated that "the Zamecki case has not
been cited by the Maryland Court of Appeals in the twelve years which have elapsed
since it was announced. [T]he case proceeds on a unique set of facts, . . . was decided
on demurrer, [and] decides only that a connection between plaintiff and the insurer
must be alleged... (Id. at 592).
14 Supra note 1. 16 Cases cited notes 3, 5, and 11 supra.
15 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964). 17 Supra note 13.
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minority view, [holding] that no duty could arise from voluntary inspec-
tion .... ,"18 The reservation of the right to inspect standing alone cannot
lead to liability on the part of the insurer even if a careful inspection could
have prevented the harm inuring to the plaintiff. Before liability can re-
sult, a duty to inspect with due care must arise by the insurer evidencing
that he has undertaken to make gratuitous inspections, or it must be
proven that the plaintiff or a third party relied on the insurer to make
gratuitous inspections to the detriment of the plaintiff. One inspection in
a three month period as in the Viducich case, 19 and inspections conducted
on a sampling basis which did not include the instrumentality harming
the plaintiff as in the Ul'welling case,20 are not demonstrative of an under-
taking or reliance. If there is no undertaking or reliance there can be no
duty to act carefully; thus, there can be no liability.
THE NONFEASANCE-MISFEASANCE DISTINCTION
The difficulty of determining whether an insurer by reservation of the
right of inspection and subsequent conduct is under a duty to inspect with
due care initially turns on whether his course of conduct can be catego-
rized as nonfeasance or misfeasance. Traditionally nonfeasance has been
defined as passive inaction not actionable unless relied upon, whereas mis-
feasance has been considered active misconduct working positive injury
to others and actionable regardless of reliance.21 However, whether
various types of conduct, in kind and in quantity, amount to nonfeasance
or misfeasance is a question too vast to be considered here. Suffice it to
say, the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is founded on
the individualistic philosophy of early common law, holding that a mere
volunteer, not presently under a duty to render aid, would not be forced
to become a benefactor. 22 Although the distinction has been criticized,
23
it continues in effect 24 and has been embodied in the Restatement of Torts.
18 Supra note 15, at 79, 199 N.E.2d at 776.
19 Supra note 1.
20 Supra note 12.
21 See generally, PROSSER, TORTS S 54 (3d ed. 1964).
22 Ibid. See also Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,
56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908).
23 For a vigorous denunciation of the nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction, see 31
J. AM. TRIAL LAW. A. 299 (1965). "This distinction continues to plague the courts and
has been perpetuated by reasoning which is lame, limp and lackluster." (Id. at 302).
See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HAv. L. REv.
913 (1951).
24 Ellsworth Brothers, Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1965) wherein the court
cited with approval PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 21, and quoted therefrom as follows:
"The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by 'misfeasance' the
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Section 325 of the Restatement, which applies to nonfeasance, states:
One who gratuitously undertakes with another to do an act or to render serv-
ices which he should recognize as necessary to the other's bodily safety and
thereby leads the other in reasonable reliance upon the performance of such
undertaking, (a) to refrain from himself taking the necessary steps to secure
his safety or from securing the then available protective action by third persons,
or (b) to enter upon a course of conduct which is dangerous unless the under-
taking is carried out, is subject to liability to the other for bodily harm resulting
from the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care to carry out his under-
taking.2 5
Section 323 (1) is applicable to misfeasance, and provides:
(1) One who gratuitously renders services to another, otherwise than by tak-
ing charge of him when helpless is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to
the other by his failure, while so doing, to exercise with reasonable care such
competence and skill as he possesses or leads the other reasonably to believe that
he possesses .... 20
The application of the nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction to a defend-
ant insurer being sued for negligence in performing a gratuitous inspection
was first expressed and illustrated in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,
as it was being considered by the Appellate Court
27 and Supreme Court28
of Illinois. The Appellate Court was of the opinion that section 325 of
the Restatement of Torts29 was controlling and absolved the insurer of
liability for nonfeasance. The Supreme Court, in overruling the decision
of the Appellate Court, held that the insurer had breached the duty to
inspect with care and was guilty of misfeasance under section 323(1)
of the Restatement.
30
The Nelson case was an action by injured employees against a work-
men's compensation carrier which had reserved the right to inspect the
practices and equipment of the plaintiffs' employer. The employer, a
general contractor constructing a courthouse in Florida, operated a hoist
in the course of the work. The injuries occurred when a cable, which
supported the hoist, snapped, sending it and the eighteen plaintiffs aboard
to the ground from a height of six floors. An action was instituted against
defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance' he
has at least made his situation no worse and has merely failed to benefit him by inter-
fering in his affairs." (Id. at 523).
25 RESTATEMENT, TORTS S 325 (1934).
201d. S 323 (1).
27 39 111. App. 2d, 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963).
28 Supra note 15.
29 Supra note 25. 30 Supra note 25, S 323.
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the insurer,8 ' alleging that it "had undertaken to inspect the employer's
safety practices and machinery, including the hoist, and [that] having
thus assumed the duty to make safety inspections, was negligent in the
performance of such duty in regard to the hoist .... "32 The Appellate
Court found no such undertaking. In considering the scope of the insurer's
undertaking, the Appellate Court limited its inquiry to the conduct of
the insurer's safety engineer at the job-site. The Appellate Court accepted
the testimony of the insurer's safety engineering that he had visited the
courthouse project only seven times over a seventeen month period and
had been there only one time in the five months preceding the accident.
Further, the employer's superintendent testified that the contractor had
its own safety program and that it did not rely on any outsiders to make
inspections. 3 There was also evidence that the recommendations of the
insurer's engineer "covered the general area of housekeeping, '3 4 that they
"were complied with so long as they were reasonable,"3 5 that the engineer
"did not check to see if they were acted upon, '30 that the engineer gave
no orders to the contractor's employees, and that he "had no control over
them. '3 7 On the basis of these facts, the Appellate Court held that the
insurer had not created a risk or danger by its misfeasance, but was
"charged only with nonfeasance, or failure to detect and report a risk,
or dangerous condition, already existing. '3 8 Thus, finding nonfeasance
without reliance, the court absolved the insurer of liability.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, rejected the analysis of the
Appellate Court and considered all the circumstances surrounding the
accident, and not only the insurer's job-site activities. As to the job-site,
31 Suits were also filed against the employer and the manufacturer of the cable. How-
ever, the jury found them not guilty of negligence and the judgments entered in their
favor were affirmed by the Supreme Court. Supra note 15, at 72, 199 NE.2d at 772-73.
32 Supra note 27, at 85, 187 N.E.2d at 429.
33 See 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 710, 712, n. 15 (1963). "One of plaintiffs' witnesses testified
that an employee of the general contractor had made regular inspections to determine
the safety of the hoist. Another witness, the foreman for the general contractor, when
asked whether or not he relied upon the inspection of the insurance company replied,
'No, Sir.' (Citation omitted.) But does this conclusively show lack of reliance by
plaintiff employees?" (Emphasis in original.)
34 Supra note 27, at 114, 187 N.E.2d at 443.
35Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37Ibid.
38 ld. at 122, 187 N.E.2d at 448. The Appellate Court then went on to conclude that
the "course of conduct did not evidence a voluntary undertaking to make any more
thorough or more frequent inspections of the hoist than those which were actually
performed, [and that more thorough and more frequent inspections were] far beyond
the scope of [the insurer's] voluntary undertaking to furnish limited safety engineering
services. .. ." (Id. at 123-24, 187 N.E.2d 448).
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the Supreme Court found that the insurer's engineer had been there many
more times than his testimony indicated. 9 More significantly, the Supreme
Court noted that the insurer conducted an extensive advertising campaign
in both national and trade publications extolling its safety inspection
service and constantly representing the countless benefits which accrued
from the service.40 The impression left by these advertisements "was that
the safety engineers took an active part in the safety programs of the
insureds and saved lives, limbs and money."'41 In addition the Supreme
Court found that the insurer's engineer had made several reports to the
insurance company concerning the job-site, referring to it as a "catas-
trophe" with "serious" hazards, 42 that while the contractor did have its
own safety program it did not employ any safety engineers, and that the
insurer's engineers had written letters to the contractor commenting on
various safety practices and their intention to assist the contractor in the
control of his accident possibilities. This evidence led the Supreme Court
to conclude that the scope of the insurer's undertaking included making
a thorough inspection with due care. The Court discarded the conservative
approach of the Appellate Court which centered exclusively on the in-
surer's limited job-site activities. Taking into consideration the expansive
scope of all the insurer's activities and representations, the Supreme Court
felt that a resultantly broad undertaking arose, which was categorized as
misfeasance when performed carelessly.
The Supreme Court criticized the Appellate Court's rejection of section
323(1) of the Restatement of Torts" as being "properly applicable only
in situations involving active negligence or misfeasance. '44 The fault
89 "[Wlhile it was [the engineer's] testimony that he made but seven visits to the
site . . . witnesses for plaintiff testified he was on the site more frequently." Supra
note 15, at 81, 199 N.E.2d at 777. The testimony was to the effect that the engineer
had been on the job-site anywhere from fifteen times up to three times a week before
the accident occurred. Supra note 27, at 112, 187 N.E.2d at 442-43 n. 20.
40 The Supreme Court considered these representations sufficiently important to
reproduce several in the opinion. Some of them are as follows: "(1) 'In case after
case month after month, [the insurer's] safety engineering service has helped contrac-
tors all over the country reduce accidents and costs;' (2) that insureds 'have worked
hand in hand with [the insurer] to build safety into every job;' (3) after explaining
that one insured had saved money, the method was stated to be: 'Close cooperation
between [the insured] and [the insurer] in designing and operating an effective safety
program;' (4) 'Thanks to thorough investigation and hazard analysis ... and immediate
investigations when accidents have occurred this nationally known firm has been
able to maintain a good accident record and to lower operating costs.'" Supra note
15, at 79-80, 199 N.E.2d at 776.
41 Supra note 15, at 80, 199 N.E.2d at 776.
42 Id. at 82, 199 N.E.2d at 777.
48 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 325 (1934).
44 Supra note 27, at 129, 187 N.E.2d at 451.
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which the Supreme Court found with this line of reasoning was that it
made misfeasance tantamount to the creation of a new risk or danger and
sustained the conclusion that the only duty owed by one who acts gratui-
tously is to refrain from positive acts of negligence. This, the Court held,
was erroneous because in those cases where insurers were liable for negli-
gent, gratuitous inspections,45 "liability rested upon a breach of duty to
make the inspections with due care, not upon acts which 'created' dan-
gers. .. ."4 Further, the Court ruled that reliance was not a condition
to holding the insurer liable. The Appellate Court had announced that
even if a thorough inspection had been within the scope of the insurer's
undertaking, no liability could result since the plaintiffs had not relied on
the insurer to render its inspection service.47 The Supreme Court held
that this rule was applicable only if the insurer was guilty of nonfeasance,
i.e., "omitting to perform an undertaking which plaintiffs.., relied upon
it to undertake .... ,"48 But the insurer was charged with misfeasance, and
having undertaken to act, the insurer "became subject to a duty with
respect to the manner of performance. '49
The differing conclusions reached by the Appellate and Supreme Courts
as to whether the insurer's conduct amounted to nonfeasance or mis-
feasance demonstrate their varying concepts of a negligent, gratuitous
undertaking.50 The Nelson case is particularly significant for having
clarified the status of the nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction and the
reliance requirement in suits involving gratuitous inspections by insurers.
Before Nelson, cases on this point had only spoken in the language of the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, had touched on or al-
luded to it, but had not precisely expanded on its importance, although
it was clear that the distinction underlied these decisions. Thus in Ulwel-
ling v. Crown Coach Corp.5' and Viducich v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins.
45 Cases cited notes 3, 5, and 11 supra.
46 Supra note 15, at 75, 199 N.E.2d at 774.
47 Supra note 27, at 133, 187 N.E.2d at 453.
48 Supra note 15, at 85, 199 N.E.2d at 779. 49 Ibid.
50 53 ILL. B. J. 349 (1964). "The conflict as to whether the facts in [the Nelson]
case constituted misfeasance or nonfeasance evidences a dichotomy between the courts
with respect to the underlying theory of negligence liability for a gratuitous under-
taking. The Appellate Court viewed the undertaking as a series of isolated acts which
the defendant was required to perform. Failure to perform any single act constituted
nonfeasance and would require reliance to be actionable. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, viewed the undertaking as a single undertaking consisting of a series of acts.
The nonperformance of any single act would then constitute negligent performance
of the entire undertaking, i.e. misfeasance, which does not require reliance to be
actionable." (Id. at 353).
51 Supra note 12.
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Co.,52 where the insurer's activities were negligible, the courts held that
no duty to inspect with due care arose, but they did not expressly
designate the activities as nonfeasant.53 Similarly, in those cases wherein
recovery was allowed against the insurer, 54 the courts stressed the suffi-
ciency of the insurer's activity without concretely mentioning nonfea-
sance or misfeasance. 55
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the Nelson case, by its discussions of
the nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction, also shed light on the require-
ment of reliance. The Court clearly adopted the rule that reliance is not
necessary for liability if the insurer was misfeasant, rather than non-
feasant, and had a duty to inspect with due care. Of this, some legalists
have said that the Nelson case is the first of its kind to predicate liability
on a basis other than reliance.56 They attempt to support their position
by referring to the following passage from Hartford Steam Boiler In-
spection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Bre'wing Co.,57 a case where facts clearly
indicated that the insurer was guilty of misfeasance. The court stated:
these facts of continuous conduct . . . in reference to the inspections and their
purpose-if relied upon by the Brewing Company and so understood by the In-
surance Company, as alleged-are of probative force to show both the under-
taking of duty and relation of the parties upon which the action for negligence
in performance thereof may be predicated.5 8
52 Viducich v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596 (Super.
Ct. 1963).
55 In Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp., supra note 12, at 134, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 654,
the court stated "that the [inspections] were not of such a nature or performed under
such circumstances as to impose any duty ... to make any kind of inspection...
In Viducich v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 52, the court after citing i 325
of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 25, said "defendant did nothing which could
have led [the employer] or any employee to believe that defendant has undertaken
to make inspections. .. ." (Id. at 23, 192 A.2d at 601).
54 Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 Fed.
617 (7th Cir. 1912); Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 52 N.J.L. 240,
19 Ad. 472 (1890); Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 Wash. 2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024
(1940) and cases cited notes 5 and 11 supra.
55 Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 54
(insurer manifested "continuous conduct" in reference to inspections); Smith v. Ameri-
can Employers' Ins. Co., supra note 5 (insurer conducted monthly inspections); Van
Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Inc. Co., supra note 54 (insurer made repeated
inspections and furnished employer with certificates); Bollin v. Elevator Constr. &
Repair Co., supra note 11 (statutory duty arose by contract); Sheridan v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., supra note 54 (insurer made six inspections in eighteen months, made
reports and sent letters).
56 53 ILL. B. J., supra note 50, at 353. Cf., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra
note 15 (Schaefer, J. dissenting); 51 VA. L. REv. 347 (1965).
57 Supra note 54.
508 Id. at 629.
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Because of the reference to reliance, these writers urge that in the past
reliance was an essential requirement for liability regardless of whether
the insurer was nonfeasant or misfeasant.
However, the court in the Hartford Steam Boiler case was confronted
with the defense that the insurer was not in privity with the plaintiff, a
defense which was a far more formidable obstacle to recovery when this
case was decided than it is today.59 Reliance was mentioned by the court
in an effort to find a tort duty which ran from defendant to plaintiff.
The court then disregarded the reliance factor and emphasized the degree
of the insurer's activities, citing numerous cases showing that much activity
directed to a gratuitous undertaking gives rise to a duty to perform it
with care. If the court intended reliance to be essential to recovery, it did
not make the point clear, but rather phrased the opinion in such a fashion
that it could be interpreted to equate an active, negligent gratuitous un-
dertaking with a breach of the duty to perform the undertaking with
care, i.e. a misfeasant performance of the undertaking. Further, in the
other cases finding the insurer liable, reliance was not discussed. 60 Yet,
in the cases where the insurer's activity was slight and his performance
nonfeasant,6I liability did not arise because the courts expressly found that
there was no reliance.
The Nelson case seems to be the first clear statement that reliance is not
a condition to liability for misfeasance, rather than the first case to
abrogate reliance in misfeasance cases. The rule adopted by the Court is
that if the insurer's activities are sufficient to give rise to an undertaking,
then liability will follow when the undertaking is not performed with
due care. Any inquiry into the element of reliance here is immaterial
because a negligent performance of an undertaking constitutes misfea-
sance. But where the activity is slight so as to properly be labeled non-
feasance, reliance is indispensable to liability. This distinction, which the
59 In Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 15, the insurer also raised the
defense of lack of privity, and in addition, contended that it did not control the
employer's equipment or employees. In disposing of these defenses, the Supreme Court
allotted one paragraph to each in its fifty-two page opinion. (ld. at 84-85, 199 N.E.2d at
778-79).
60 Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., supra note 54; Smith v. Ameri-
can Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960); Bollin v. Elevator Constr.
& Repair Co., supra note 11; Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra note 54. But see,
53 ILL. B. J., supra note 50. "In Van Winkle v. American Steam Boiler Company no
express reference was made to reliance. However the court found that the activity of
the defendant insurer was so extensive that the insurer had effectively substituted its
inspection for that of the insured. The substitution principle announced by the Van
Winkle court appears to be an expression of total reliance by the insured." (ld. at 353).
(Footnote omitted.)
61 Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp., supra note 12; Viducich v. Greater N.Y. Mut.
Ins. Co., supra note 52.
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earlier cases struggled with, was sharply brought to the fore by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in the Nelson case.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CARRIER AS A THIRD PARTY
TORTFEASOR-THE PROBLEM OF IMMUNITY
From the preceding discussion, with its pivotal point being the Nelson
case, it has been seen that liability can be incurred on a gratuitous under-
taking. In the sphere of insurers, liability has arisen out of careless safety
inspections, since such inspections are gratuitous undertakings. But a
condition to liability for negligent inspection is that the activity of the
insurer is sufficient to constitute misfeasance, or that the insurer was non-
feasant in respect to the inspections and the plaintiff relief, to his detri-
ment, on the inspections being made. This much applies to insurers in
general, but several factors which add to the complexities of the topic
under discussion have not, as yet, been included. Henceforth, the discus-
sion will be addressed specifically to the right of inspection reserved by
insurers where: (1) the insurer is a workmen's compensation carrier, (2)
the plaintiff is an employee of the employer insured by the carrier, (3)
the employee's injuries are proximately caused by the carrier's negligent,
gratuitous inspection, and (4) the employee's injuries are also compensable
under a compensation statute. Under these circumstances, such matters
as statutory immunity, policy considerations, and others, to be discussed,
must be considered in determining if the employee's action is or ought
to be maintainable. However, in order to achieve a better understanding
of these considerations a general discussion of workmen's compensation
is necessary.
Workmen's compensation statutes arose out of dissatisfaction with the
old, slow, and expensive tort system of employer's liability: founded on
proof of the employer's negligence, subject to the employer's defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and negligence by a
third party employee which worked to prevent workmen from recover-
ing for injuries they had sustained. 62 They were enacted to provide a
mechanism for the speedy payment of wage and medical losses to injured
employees6s by eliminating the tort concept of fault and imposing strict
liability for a work connected injury.64 For those employees covered by a
62 Report of Special Committee Appointed to Study the Workmen's Compensation
Law and to Cooperate with the Moreland Act Commission Investigating Workmen's
Compensation Costs, Operations and Procedures, New York State Bar Association
6-7 (1957).
63 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § I (1965).
64 Id. § 2.10.
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statute,65 workmen's compensation is intended to compensate for eco-
nomic loss, not for physical injury.66 As such, the recovery by a claimant
of his statutory claim is not as large as his judgment could have been had
he sued in a common law negligence action,67 but this is the consideration
given by the employee in exchange for fast compensation of work in-
juries regardless of fault.6 8 In addition, a workmen's compensation statute
deprives the employee of all other rights and remedies in regard to his
injury that he would otherwise have had against his employer.6 9 But
while an employer enjoys immunity from a common law action of an
employee, some others do not, and all American jurisdictions preserve
the employee's tort action against a third party tortfeasor who has proxi-
mately caused his injury.70 Against which third party tortfeasors a com-
65 Not all wage-earners are entitled to benefits under workmen's compensation
statutes for job connected injuries. U.S. DF'T OF LABOR, BvaAU OF LABOR STANDARDS,
BULL. 161, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS AS OF MAY 1960, 13, TABLE 2; Cham-
ber of Commerce of the U.S., Analysis of Workmen's Compensation Laws as of January
1962, 25, Chart IV (a).
66 Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Re-
view of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 57, 81 (1963). For an exten-
sive bibliography of literature on workmen's compensation see, McDermott, The
Law of Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability: A Selected List of Mate-
rials, 1950-1963. 16 VAND. L. REv. 1159 (1963).
67 For a discussion of the general tendency toward higher verdicts see, Belli, The
Adequate Award, 39 CALF. L. REV. 1 (1951).
6 S Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's
Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 555-56 (1963).
69 McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities
and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TExAS L. REV. 389, 392-93 (1959). E.g., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (a) (1965). "No common law or statutory right to recover damages
from the employer or his employees for injury or death sustained by any employee
while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation
herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions
of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representa-
tives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury."
705 U.S.C. S 776 (1964); 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964); ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 312 (Cum. Supp.
1963); ALASKA STAT. §23.30.015(a)(1962); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §23-1023 (Cum.
Supp. 1965); ARK. STAT. Aaw. § 81-1340 (1960); CALIF. LAB. CODE § 3852 (Deering
1964); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-8 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-156 (1958);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 S 2363 (Cum. Supp. 1964); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1961);
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 440-39 (Cum. Supp. 1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-403 (Supp. 1965);
Gov. CODE TERR. GUAM § 37003 (1960); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 97-8 (Supp. 1963); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 72. 204 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1965); IND. ANN. STAT.
S 40-1213 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.22 (Cum. Supp. 1965); KAN. STAT. ANN.
144-504 (1963); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.055 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1101
(West 1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 39, S 68 (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN. art. 101
S 58 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, S 15 (1962); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.189 (1960);
MIN. STAT. ANN. S 176.061 (Supp. 1965); MIss. CODE ANN. S6998-36 (1952); Mo.
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mon law tort action can be maintained depends on the individual statute.71
Thus a fellow employee may be immune from such an action either by
statute72 or judicial decision,73 or similarly a contractor may not be sub-
ject to suit.
7 4
The question of immunity is a recurrent one in common law actions
by an employee against the compensation carrier. In some jurisdictions,
the insurer is expressly granted immunity by statute or through judicial
interpretation.75 Where immunity is not expressly provided for, insurers
have raised the defense that they step into the shoes of the employer and
are immune from an action by an employer on that basis. This defense
ANN. STAT. § 287.150 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 92-204 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT.
S48-118 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 616.560 (1963); N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 281: 14
(Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 15-40 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. 59-10-69 (Supp.
1957); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (1) (6) (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1963);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1952);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.154 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Cum. Supp. 1965);
P. R. LAWS tit. 11, § 32 (1962); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-35-58 (Supp. 1965); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 72-122, 72-401 (1962); S.D. CODE § 64.0301 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-914 (Cum. Supp. 1965); Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Cum. Supp.
1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 624 (Cum. Supp.
1966); VIR. ISL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 263 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.38, 65.99 (1950);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.010 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (1957); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-154 (1957). Ohio and West Virginia have no specific statutory provi-
sions allowing a third party action, but they have been acknowledged by case law.
Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 110 Ohio St. 208, 146 N.E. 306 (1924);
Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W.Va. 669,92 S.E. 112 (1917).
71 For a classification of workmen's compensation statutes according to their im-
munity provisions see, McCoid, supra note 69, at 403-04. Professor McCoid sets up
four categories: "first, those statutes which recognize a right of action against 'persons
other than the employer' or 'third persons,' which comprise the majority of statutes in
the United States. Second, those statutes which recognize a right of action against
'persons other than the employer' but also contain provisions to the effect that if the
employer has insured his liability under the act the compensation benefits shall be the
exclusive remedy against 'the employer and those conducting his business' or against
every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of such employer when he is
acting in furtherance of that employer's business and does not inflict any injury with
deliberate intention.' .. . Third, those statutes which recognize a right of action against
'any person not in the same employ.' . .. Fourth, those statutes which make no provi-
sion for third party liability." (Footnotes omitted).
7 2 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1965); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306
§ 3 (Cum. Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-99 (1950).
73 White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d 843 (1955); Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass.
593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934).
74 See, 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 63, § 74.10-40; 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 842 (perm. ed. 1941 Cum. Supp. 1958, Supp. 1964).
7 5 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1206 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-36 (1952); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 287.300 (1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:14 (Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59 10-4 (F) (1953); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 3 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
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has met with success in a majority of jurisdictions where employees have
sued the workmen's compensation carrier.76 In Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 77 the court held that by the California Workmen's Compensation
Act subrogation provision, the carrier was "subrogated to all the rights
and duties of the employer," 78 including the right to the employer's im-
munity. In Flood v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,79 the court, in interpreting
the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Law, held "that when the Legis-
lature ... authorized employers to contract with insurance companies in
order to cover possible claims . . . it intended the insurance carrier to
stand in the position of the employer."80 Also in Schultz v. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co.,81 the subrogation provision of the Idaho Compensation Act was
interpreted to deny the employee's right to maintain the action.
In a few jurisdictions, the insurer's contention of immunity has been
rejected.82 Generally, the courts here have interpreted the various com-
pensation statutes as extending immunity only to employers in the strict-
est sense. 88 They have also sought to distinguish the cases granting immu-
nity to the insurer84 on several bases. One such ground is that the cases
immunizing the insurer 5 involve fact situations where injury or death
resulted from aggravation of industrial injuries by the treatment of doc-
tors furnished or employed by insurance carriers pursuant to policy or
statutory obligation, rather than from a negligent gratuitous safety in-
spection. Under these circumstances, it is argued that these cases are not
in point and cannot be considered controlling authority. It is urged that,
76 Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928); Donohue v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 248 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1965); Kotarski v. Aetna Gas. and Sur. Co., 244
F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich 1965); Schultz v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411
(E.D. Wash. 1954); Fernandez v. Gantz, 113 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1953); Noe v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959); Flood v. Merchants Mut.
Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963); McDonald v. Employers' Liab. Assur.
Corp., 288 Mass. 170, 192 N.E. 608 (1934); Hughes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 76 S.W.2d
1101 (Kans. City Ct. of App. 1934); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 148 Okla. 28, 296
Pac. 977 (1931).
77 Supra note 76.
78 Id. at 435. 80 ld. at 377, 187 A.2d at 322.
79 Supra note 76. 81 Supra note 76.
82 Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963); Nelson v. Union Wire
Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 796 (1964) (interpreting Florida Compensation
Act); Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963);
Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., supra note 55; Mager v. United Hosps. of
Newark, 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664 (App. Div. 1965).
88 E.g., Mager v. United Hosps. of Newark, supra note 82, at 426, 212 A.2d at 666.
"The definition of 'employer' in the Workmen's Compensation Act negatives the
argument that the employer and his compensation carrier must be considered as one
and the same."
84 Supra note 76. 85 Ibid.
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(1) the act of inspecting is not performed by the carrier pursuant to
specific provisions of a compensation statute directing such performance
by the carrier, as is the case in the malpractice situation, 6 and that, (2)
in the aggravated injury circumstances, the negligence of the carrier is
not the cause of the original injury, as it is where there has been a neg-
ligent inspection.8 7 As was stated by the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire in Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co.,s8 when distinguishing
that case from the malpractice case of Schultz v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co.: 8 9
[I]n the case before us, contrary to the situation in the Schultz case, the de-
fendant is not being sued because of anything it did pursuant to either our
compensation statute or the policy of compensation insurance issued by it, but
because of independent action undertaken which it is alleged resulted in the
plaintiff's injuries.90
The distinction drawn between a statutory and a common law duty has not
been persuasive to courts or legislatures since it was first espoused in the
Smith case."' In fact, in the next session of the New Hampshire legisla-
ture the holding in the Smith case was overruled by amending the New
Hampshire Workmen's Compensation Act to equate the carrier with the
employer"2 and expressly grant the carrier immunity from a third party
action.938
In recent cases involving actions by employees against compensation
carriers for negligent inspections, rather than aggravation of injuries,
9 4
the courts not only noted that the safety inspections are an integral part of
the carrier's function, but also that an employer, pursuant to his duty to
provide a safe working place for his employees, has the duty to make
safety inspections.9 5 If the employer breaches this common law duty and
an employee is injured as a result thereof, an action by the employee
86 See 26 NACCA L. J. 223, 225-26 (1960).
87 See 31 J. AM. TRIAL LAW. A. 299, 315-16 (1965).
88 Supra note 55. 89 Supra note 76.
90 Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., supra note 55, at 537-38, 163 A.2d at 570
(opinion on rehearing).
91 Supra note 55.
92 N.H. RE. STAT. ANN. S 281:2 (1961).
93 N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. S 281: 14 (Supp. 1965). 'When an injury for which com-
pensation is payable . . . has been sustained under circumstances creating in some
person other than the employer, or the employer's insurance carrier, a legal liability
to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee ... may obtain damages from
or proceed at law against such person to recover damages ....
94 Donohue v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 76; Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
supra note 76.
905Long Co. v. State Acc. Fund, 156 Md. 639, 144 Atl. 775 (1929).
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against the employer in tort is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
workmen's compensation statute, just as it would be had the employer
breached a statutory duty. This being so, the courts find no meaningful
reason for granting immunity to an insurer when it performs a duty
imposed on the employer by statute, but refusing immunity when the
insurer performs a duty imposed on the employer at common law.96 In
both instances the insurer steps into the shoes of the employer and should
be immune, since it is the performance of the required duty, rather than
the duty's origin, which is the relevant factor. Further, it is not the activity
of the carrier upon which immunity is predicated. Immunity either does
or does not exist in proportion to the closeness of the relationship between
the carrier and the employer. In Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
97
the court stated:
[I]t is not so much what the insurance carrier is doing that makes it immune,
it is the relationship of the carrier and the employer. Certainly, an employer
does not lose its statutory immunity whenever it does something not required
by the compensation act. If the activity of the insurer, for which it was alleged
to be negligent, bore no substantial relationship to its position as the employer's
workmen's compensation carrier, 98 ... there would be no logical reason to hold
the carrier immune. However, where the carrier is performing an integral part
of its function under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it should be immune
under the same reasoning which makes it immune when performing a required
activity.99
Another ground announced by the courts denying the insurer immu-
nity and distinguishing those cases granting immunity is the variations in
the particular compensation statutes. All of the courts agree that the
problem of immunity is one of statutory interpretation, and where im-
munity has been refused, the courts, of course, were of the opinion that
proper construction of the statute led to the conclusion that immunity
was not intended. In fact, even after the New Hampshire Legislature had
passed the amendment' 00 overruling the Smith case,' 0 ' the court in Fabri-
cius v. Montgomery Elevator Co. 10 2 and Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 08
96 Donohue v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 76, at 591-92.
97 Supra note 76.
98 Here the court gave its own example of an activity which would not be sub-
stantially related to the insurer's position as a compensation carrier. The example is:
"if an automobile collision occurred between the employee, while driving his em-
ployer's vehicle on the employer's business, and a vehicle operated by the insurance
company's employee who also happened to be acting in the course of his employ-
ment ... ." Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76.
99 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76, at 558.
100 See notes 92 and 93 supra.
101 Supra note 55. 102 Supra note 82. 103 Ibid.
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mentioned that the subsequent action by the Legislature was not an indi-
cation that the New Hampshire Supreme Court had misinterpreted the
statute before it was amended. 04 However, the differences in the statutes
do not appear to be as significant as the difference of philosophies used in
interpreting the statutes. Basically, the decision to grant or deny the in-
surer immunity turns on whether the particular court considers work-
men's compensation statutes as exclusive substitutes for common law
liability. If they do, then an action against a third party tortfeasor for
injuries which resulted from a job related accident must be specifically
provided for in the statute; otherwise, the employee would be subject to
the absolute provisions of the workmen's compensation system. If the
court does not accept the view that the compensation statute is an exclu-
sive substitute, then the employee can proceed against any third party not
specifically immunized by the statute, since, under this theory, the statute
in no way impairs the right to bring such a suit. The thinking of the
courts denying immunity is perhaps best illustrated by the following from
Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co.:10 5 "If the employee's common
law action is taken from him, what has done so? Certainly it cannot be
the insurance policy. We do not find a statute that imperatively compels
that result."'10 6
Conversely, where immunity has been granted, the courts emphasize
the statutory basis of the employee's action'0 7 and examine their statute
for a provision or legislative intent allowing it. Since no workmen's com-
pensation statute specifically sanctions an action by an employee against
a carrier, these courts read their compensation act as a whole to deter-
mine if the employee's suit was envisioned. 08 Thus, with the scope of the
inquiry being so broadly based, these courts can readily find that the
action was not intended and that the carrier is immune.
The difference in interpretative philosophies also explains the varying
conclusions reached by the courts on the issue of subrogation and the
insurer's so-called double-recovery defense. Most workmen's compensa-
tion statutes have subrogation provisions of some sort whereby the payor
104 Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 82, at 177; Fabricius v. Montgomery
Elevator Co., supra note 82, at 1327, 121 N.W.2d at 365.
1o Supra note 82.
106ld. at 1325, 121 N.W.2d at 364-65. (Emphasis added.) The opinion then went
on to state that "it is the policy of this court not to interpret a statute as depriving
one of a common law right unless the statute clearly so states." (Id. at 1327, 121 N.W.2d
at 366).
107 In Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76, the court said that, "an
action by an employee for a compensable injury caused by a third party, while a com-
mon law and not a statutory cause of action, is regulated by statute." (ld. at 559).
(Footnote omitted.)
10 8 ld. at 552.
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of the compensation is subrogated to the rights of the payee-employee
whenever the employee recovers damages from a third party tortfeasor.
The result is that the payor is reimbursed for any compensation paid and
the employee retains the balance of the judgment. 0 9 Commonly, sub-
rogation provisions allow the payor to bring the action against the third
party,110 or give the payor a lien against any recovery by the employee
for compensation paid or payable."' In those jurisdictions where the
carrier is by statute compelled to pay compensation directly to the em-
ployee, it has contended that it must be immune from a suit by the
employee since it is impossible, thereafter by subrogation, to sue or have
a lien against itself.
The courts denying immunity have not accepted this argument. They
have held that these provisions are merely procedural, do not apply to
the subject matter of the employee's third party action, and, therefore,
can have no effect on it. Further, they do not feel that these provisions
allow the employee to recover twice, once on his compensation claim
and again in his common law suit, but instead interpret the statutes to
give a set off to the insurer for compensation paid. 112 The courts granting
immunity agree that this interpretation adequately protects the insurer,
but deny the validity of the interpretation. Rejecting the idea that the
employee's third party action can exist without a statutory provision to
that effect, these courts hold that the legislatures would never have en-
acted subrogation provisions had they anticipated the insurer being held
liable as a third party tortfeasor. 18 Thus finding legislative disapproval
of the action, the insurer is granted immunity.
A final distinction drawn in these cases is whether the liability of the
carrier to secure compensation is primary or secondary. If, by statutory
mandate, the carrier assumes the obligations of the employer for pay-
ment of compensation directly to the employee who has suffered a job-
connected injury its liability is primary. But if the statute imposes the
duty on the employer to satisfy the liability which arises out of such
injury, then the carrier is, in effect, a surety, and its duty to make pay-
ment to the employee is secondary to that of the employer's. Where the
liability is secondary, as under the Florida statute 14 considered in the
Nelson case, 115 immunity is denied. Where the liability is primary, as
109 2 LARSON Op. cit. supra note 63, §§ 74.00-.20.
110 E.g., Flood v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 76.
111 E.g., Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76.
112 Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., supra note 82, at 1325-26, 121 N.W.2d at
365.
113 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76, at 553.
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440-39 (Cum. Supp. 1965). 115 Supra note 82.
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under the Michigan statute'" considered in Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and
Sur. Co.,"'7 immunity is granted. The reason for these holdings is that
where the carrier's liability is secondary, and there is no inevitability of
payment the essential requisite for immunity is missing,"18 since "it is
the liability to secure compensation which gives the employer immunity
from suit as a third party tort-feasor."" 9 But where the insurer has the
primary duty to secure workmen's compensation for the employees of
the insured the insurer is entitled to immunity, since "it is this primary,
unvariable responsibility which makes the workmen's compensation insur-
ance carrier so vital to the effectiveness of the . . . workmen's compen-
sation scheme .... 120
The distinction between primary and secondary liability like those
between the statutory and common law basis of a third party action and
the difference in the compensation statutes, is much discussed by the
courts in granting or denying immunity. Yet, the underlying theme com-
mon to all of these decisions is whether or not, in the opinion of the court,
the workmen's compensation statute abrogated or left unaffected the em-
ployee's third party action. The Kotarski case, 121 after devoting the
usual space to the aforementioned distinctions, granted the carrier im-
munity, and concluded with the following passage directed at the appli-
cability of the Smith and Fabricius cases from Mager v. United Hosps. of
Newark,122 when the case was being decided by the New Jersey Superior
Court, before its reversal by the Appellate Division: 128 "Despite these
distinctions, the philosophy of these opinions would probably permit an
action here, but I reject this philosophy."'
124
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The question of whether a workman's compensation carrier is amenable
to a tort action by an injured employee for a negligent, gratuitous safety
inspection is a relatively new one. The development of this area of law
lacks certainty and consistency because the cases which have considered
the point cannot be regarded as having a time-honored precedent value,
116 MICH. STAT. ANN. S 17.189 (1960). 117 Supra note 76.
118 Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 82, at 98, 199 N.E.2d at 786.
110 Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So.2d 285, 287 (Fla. 1954), cited in Nelson v.
Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 82, at 97, 199 N.E.2d at 785.
120 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76, at 557.
121 Supra note 76.
122 81 N.J. Super. 585, 196 A.2d 282 (Super. Ct. 1963).
128 Supra note 82.
124 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 76, at 559.
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especially where the cases were decided by a sharply divided court, 2 5
and because the courts have developed several distinctions which can
logically be manipulated to achieve either result in a given case. Under
these circumstances, considerations of policy are of great importance
since they may ultimately affect the side a court will choose to take. But
again, as with the other factors considered in these cases, there is no
unanimity on which aspects of policy should be emphasized.
No one denies the beneficial effect workmen's compensation statutes
have had on the promotion of safety and the prevention of accidents.126
While there are those who believe workmen's compensation in general
and safety control in particular are better provided for by private in-
surers,127 and those who feel a state fund system is preferable, 28 it is clear
that a workmen's compensation system, in potential and in practice, re-
duces industrial injuries. It is this aspect of the system which some legis-
latures regard as the most significant.
129
The policy argument for denying the employee's action against the
insurer is that the contribution to accident prevention made by insurers
should not be overlooked and a continuation of their inspection activities
should not be dampened by a possibility of "incurring unlimited liability
for failing to discover a hazard that some jury might think ought to have
been discovered."'u 0 The inspection services of insurers "should be en-
couraged rather than discouraged,"'u 8 lest the insurers cease making
inspections.
The contention that an activity which has been helpful in the past
should not be the subject of litigation when it turns out to be harmful in
the present is not at all impressive to those courts and authors who favor
125 Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960),
allowed the employee's action by a vote of three to two, and the decision was subse-
quently overruled by an amendment to the New Hampshire Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. See notes 92 and 93 supra. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 82,
found the insurer liable in a four to three decision, and Justice Daily, whose vote was
decisive for the majority in that case has since passed away.
126 See Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A
Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis L. REv. 57, 63 (1963).
127 St. Clair, The Case For Private Insurance of Workmen's Compensation, 31
RocKy MT. L. Rv. 397 passim (1959).
128 Clayman, In Defense of State Workmen's Compensation Funds, 31 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 428 passim (1959).
129 Massachusetts Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents Report
46 (1912).
130 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547, 558 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
(Footnote omitted.)
131 Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 82, at 121, 199 N.E.2d 797 (House,
J., dissenting).
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the employee's third party action. They feel that this position is out-
weighed by the old, venerable maxim that an injury caused by legally
wrongful conduct should be adequately compensated and point out that
workmen's compensation does not and was never intended to adequately
compensate an injured employee. 132 This inadequacy and older policy
justify the third party action.188 Further, while they recognize the role
played by insurers in accident prevention, the argument that the added
liability will drive compensation carriers from the field is countered by
the statement so often repeated that, by now, it has taken on proportions
of a battlecry, rather than a rebuttal, viz., "No inspection is better than
a negligent inspection."'18 4 They express the doubt that all insurers will
discontinue their safety inspections, 13 5 since it is these same inspections
which reduce accidents and, in the long run, will consequently reduce the
overall cost of the insurers.18 6 The result will be the initiation of more
intensive inspection programs both quantitatively and qualitatively, by
insurers.137
It is true that not all insurers will discontinue their safety inspection
practices, as the inspections must be made to protect their interests since
"it would be economically foolish ... to allow accidents which could be
easily prevented to occur."'38 But it is improbable that these inspection
programs will be stepped up. A negligent inspection may be worse than
no inspection in a particular case, but, considering this statement in its
entire context, it seems highly unlikely that most insurers will increase
their inspection efforts in order to achieve an even better safety record.
Insurance companies are "an inviting target when the plaintiff is inter-
ested in circumventing the limited recoveries permitted and the immuni-
132 Report of Special Committee Appointed to Study the Workmen's Compensation
Law and to Cooperate with the Moreland Act Commission Investigating Workmen's
Compensation Costs, Operations and Procedures, New York State Bar Association 7-8
(1957); Brodie, supra note 126, at 81.
133 51 VA. L. REV. 347, 349 (1965).
134 Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1963); Fabricius v.
Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 1327, 121 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1963); Page,
The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right to
Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. IN'o. & COM. L. REv. 555, 558, n. 19 (1963); 31 J. AM.
TRIAL LAW. A. 299, 316 (1965) quoting from Brief for Appellant, p. 5, 115, Nelson v.
Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); 30 NACCA L. J. 247,
249 (1964); 51 VA. L. REV. 347, 351 (1965).
135 See e.g., Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., supra note 134, at 1327, 121
N.W.2d at 366.
136 51 VA. L. REV. 347, 352 (1965), citing LANG, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE
112-16, 163-64 (1947).
137 53 ILL. B. J. 349, 354, n. 25 (1964), citing O'BRIEN, HAZARDS IN SAFETY 8 (1963).
See also 51 VA. L. REV. 347, 352 (1965).
138 Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra note 130.
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ties granted by the compensation act,"'8 9 and it might also be mentioned
that they are favorite targets for juries and sizable judgments. Insurers
will not be anxious to provide any kind of inspection service if it involves
the risk of being liable for enormous damages,'140 and the probable result
will be some insurers abandoning the inspection field and most insurers
curtailing their safety service.' 4 ' Therefore, while in theory better safety
inspections would cause the insurer's costs and the insured's premiums to
decrease, the practical effect of holding the insurer liable is that fewer
insurers will be willing to continue their inspection services with a resultant
increase in costs, premiums, and accidents. 42 As stated:
If an insurance company can escape tort liability altogether by not making any
inspection .... but may incur unlimited tort liability by making some inspec-
tions, it more than likely will decline to make any, unless required to do so by
statute. The ultimate losers will be workmen and their families.' 48
CONCLUSION-A PREVIEW OF INSURER'S DEFENSES
At the present time, the majority of jurisdictions do not allow an em-
ployee to bring a tort action against his employer's workmen's compen-
sation carrier for injuries proximately caused by a negligent, gratuitous
safety inspection. Some of these jurisdictions outlaw the action by statute.
The others judicially interpret their compensation act to find an implied
intent barring it. Contrarily, a few courts recognize the employee's right
to maintain the action, and insurers have failed to advance a successful
defense to counter the reasonng followed in these states. However, in
most of the cases where an injured employee has sued a workmen's com-
pensation carrier for negligence in making a safety inspection, the em-
ployee has received part or all of his statutory compensation award.
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Subsequently, the employee institutes his action against the insurer. This
creates a situation which the insurers in those jurisdictions which have
allowed the employee to maintain his action might possibly be able to
take advantage of in the future. As previously mentioned, insurers have
raised the defense that to allow the employee's action is to allow him a
double-recovery under the various subrogation provisions of the work-
men's compensation statutes. They argue that they are required to pay
1s9 Ibid.
140 The damages in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 134, amounted
to $1,569,400.00 (Id. at 72, 199 N.E.2d at 772).
1
4
1 See 53 ILL. B.J. 349, 354 (1964).
14 2 See 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 710, 712 (1963).
'43 Id. at 558-59.
144 See, e.g., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., supra note 134; Smith v. American
Employers' Ins. Co., supra note 125.
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to the employee both the compensation award and the judgment rendered
in his tort action, which permits the employee to recover twice in spite
of their statutory right of subrogation. The argument continues that the
subrogation provisions either give the insurer a lien on the judgment to
the extent of the workmen's compensation paid, or it allows the insurer
to proceed at law against the employee's tortfeasor, who, in this case, is
the same insurer. The insurer's conclusion is that the maintenance of the
employee's suit sanctions a double recovery, since one cannot have a
lien against or sue himself. The basis for this defense is statutory and it is
successful in accordance with the philosophy of statutory interpretation
utilized by the court. But, as yet, an insurer has not attempted to couch
its double-recovery defense in terms of common law principles and there-
by avoid the statutory roadblocks. The carriers could accomplish this by
relying on the common law principle that a plaintiff cannot recover more
than once from the same defendant for a single injury caused by the de-
fendant. This principle is generally brought out in cases involving the
doctrines of splitting a cause of action,145 multiplicity of suits, 140 and elec-
tion of remedies,'147 although the doctrines would not be applicable to
the situation of an employee suing a compensation carrier after taking
his compensation claim. No election of remedies is involved here, since,
before the employee is put to an election, his remedies must be incon-
sistent, 48 and his third party action is supplementary to rather than
inconsistent with his claim for workmen's compensation. 149 Similarly, the
employee cannot dispose of all of his claims in one action, since he can
neither claim workmen's compensation in a court of law nor ask for tort
damages in a hearing before a workman's compensation board, and this
is an essential prerequisite to the applicability of the doctrines of multi-
plicity of suits'50 and splitting a cause of action.' 5 ' Moreover, cases demon-
strating the common law double-recovery principle typically involved
situations where the plaintiff is injured in his person and his property as a
result of a single occurrence and institutes an action to recover for one
after having commenced an action for recovery on the other.152 Thus,
these cases can be distinguished from the workmen's compensation situ-
145 Daniel v. City of Tucson, 52 Ariz. 142, 79 P.2d 516 (1938); Pomeroy v. Prescott,
106 Me. 401, 76 Ad. 898 (1910); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960 (1926).
140 Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, 167 Ga. 439, 145 S.E. 851 (1928); Grue v.
Hensley, 357 Mo. 592, 210 S.W.2d 7 (1948); Strapp v. Andrews, 172 Tenn. 610, 113
S.W.2d 749 (1938).
147 Glezos v. Glezos, 346 IN. 96, 178 N.E. 379 (1931).
148 Ibid. 14926 NACCA L.J. 223,225 (1960).
150 Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
151 Perry's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 199 Ky. 396, 251 S.W. 202 (1923).
152 See, e.g., Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, supra note 146; Vasu v. Kohlers,
Ind., supra note 150.
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ation by their facts and by their application of the common law double-
recovery principle.
However, in spite of the technical distinctions which can be drawn, it
would seem that the fundamental basis for refusing to allow more than one
proceeding on a single injury is the same in all instances. An employee be-
comes entitled to a workmen's compensation award when he suffers a job-
connected injury. If the injury was caused by the tortious conduct of a
third person other than one who has been granted immunity, the employee
may maintain a tort action against such person, but in either case the single
transaction or occurrence out of which the injury arose is the job-con-
nected accident. When the third party tortfeasor is a person unrelated to
and unconcerned with the employee's compensation award, there is no
just reason for denying the third party action, since a plaintiff certainly
can bring two separate actions against two separate defendants whenever
each defendant has legally wronged the plaintiff, even though the harm to
the plaintiff resulted from a single transaction. But after an insurer has paid
the compensation award to the employee or has agreed to a settlement in
regard to the claim, the employee's subsequent action, while proceeding
on the theory of negligence rather than strict liability involved in a claim
for workmen's compensation, is a second action based on the same transac-
tion against the same defendant. The insurer, therefore, is subjected to
multiple actions and liabilities, and the contention that the insurer is
allowed a set off against the judgment in the tort action to the extent of
compensation already paid would not seem to be material. The second
action involves harassment and is vexatious and oppressive litigation, as a
second attempt to again recover on an injury already compensated.
Insurers in those jurisdictions which have allowed a third party action
by an employee against a carrier for negligent safety inspection cannot
rely solely on the defenses they have raised in the past. Where the insurer
has been held liable, the courts proceed on the theory, bolstered by their
concept of public policy, that workmen's compensation statutes do not
abrogate a common law right to maintain a tort action unless the statute
so provides. While doubt has been expressed here as to the soundness of
the rationale leading to that conclusion, it seems equally doubtful that de-
fenses such as statutory immunity, based as they are on a contrary philos-
ophy of statutory interpretation, will be more persuasive in the future than
they have been until now. Insurers, if they are to prevail in these jurisdic-
tions, must formulate a defense based on common law principles in order to
side-step the pitfalls they have previously incurred. The prohibition
against a double recovery, if used as a basis for arguing that the em-
ployee's action is barred not by statute but by common law, appears to be
the most workable principle for providing such a defense.
Robert Williams
